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Decision Making in Large Organizations
It is tempting to point out the lack of formal
techniques typically used by large organizations, digress on
the advantages of formal over informal methods of decision
making, then conclude with a list of specific decision areas
in which formal techniques should be instituted. Before
going into this, however, it is worth noting that formal
techniques, whether they go under the guise of computerized
management information systems, operations research,
decision theory, or what have you, have a disappointing
track record in general management, although there have
been, to be sure, some outstanding successes. Part of the
reason for this may lie in the way decisions tend to get
made in organizations, whether the methods used be formal or
informal. This subject is discussed in Section A„ Then in
Section B. a taxonomy of decision making is developed and
discussed, with particular emphasis on matching problems
with potential solution techniques. Section C. describes
the elements of one particular analytic approach, decision
analysis. Finally in Section Do the problem of using
analytic methods, including decision theory, in an effective
manner in real organizations is taken up.. This section
includes a review of the literature dealing with
applications of decision theory in large organizations, and
summarizes some general principles of insuring successful
applied work.
A. Organization Goal Setting and Decision Making
In traditional economic theory, business firms act in
such a way as to maximize profits, given that there are
behavioral constraints imposed by the competition, the
marketplace, government, and society. The picture of
decision making in this theory is that of managers and

A.1. Organizational Goals
Any organization is, at heart, a coalition of
individuals, each with his own set of goals. These
individuals are, in turn, organized into groups, the groups
into larger groups, and so on, with each level adding a new
set of goals. How then does one manage to set goals for the
entire organization without causing fatal conflict? There
are two answers to this question: first, the goals
themselves are structured in such a way as to avoid
conflict; and second, the goal setting mechanism allows for
conflict resolution.
Goals are rareLy structured in precise, unambiguous
terms. On the contrary, studies of organizational
objectives suggest that agreement on objectives usually
exists only when objectives are highly ambiguous, and that
behind this agreement lies considerable uncertainty and
disagreement on subgoals. To a large extent critical areas
of conflict are never brought into the open, and agreeing,
in essence, to disagree is usually a semi-permanent way of
life. Goals which are set usually take the form of
aspiration levels, which are subject to change over time,
rather than impereti.ves to "maximize" or "minimize." This
tends to make conflict resolution less urgent, as
organizational units are judged by the degree to which they
attain the aspiration levels, which are largely set
according to past experience, rather than by what is
theoretically possible.
The goal setting mechanism is also an important
stabilizing influence. Organizational goals are not, as a
rule, set through a process of analytic determination of
optimal procedures, but through a bargaining process. The
parties to the goal-setting reach agreements through sharing
rewards, not only such monetary rewards as budgets,

salaries, and contracts, bat nonmonitary rewards as well:
promotions, citations, policies, personal treatments,
private commitments, etc. This process allows parties to
settle conflicts through relatively non-disruptive
mechanisms. The objectives resulting from this process have




1. They are imperfectly rationalized. The exact. forms
of the agreements will depend at least as much on the
bargaining skills of tne leaders, the history of the
bargaining session, and the particualr resource
scarcities faced as on the merits of the issues
themselves.
2,. Some objectives are stated in the form of
aspiration-level committments, such as "We must
allocate ten per cent of our total budget to research."
The determination of the "ten per cent" undoubtedly has
little to do with cost/benefit analyses of the
particular research projects available, but a good deal
to do with the presitge, power, and persuasiveness of
the research director.
3- Some objectives are stated in a nonoperational form.
Such objectives have the advantage of being consistent
with virtually any set of operational objectives. For
example, nonoperational goals are evidenced in such
political rhetoric as "He must 'crack down 1 on crime,
while simultaneously protecting citizens rights and
eliminating police brutality." This can oe cited in
favor of such diverse operational goals as increasing
the use of wiretapping and eliminating the use of
wiretapping.
Once organizational objectives have been established, a
number of stabilizing mechanisms tend to make them
permanent. Budgets are based partly on past budgets.
Allocations of functions and other precedents are remember!

and followed, sometimes taking the form of "rules of thumb"
or "the usual way we do things," and occasionally becoming
part of the standard operating procedure. Thus accidents of
organizational geneology tend to become perpetuated, to be
abandoned only under pressure. Furthur, organizations tend
to build up a certain amount of "fat" (termed
"organizational slack" by Cyert and March) . In case of
adversity, this provides a cushion so that business as usual
can continue, perhaps indefinitely or at least until a new
bargaining cycle can be completed.
It is worth contrasting the preceeding description of
organizational goal setting with an objective, or "rational"
procedure, which would reguire the firm to predict the
environment, survey all possible actions, then pick a set of
goals which would result in the best actions. It is not at
all clear that the objective procedure, even if it were
possible to implement it, would be the better way to choose
goals. Clearly the actual process contains valuable
mechanisms for keeping the organization stable and viable,
and substituting the "rational" procedure could easily
result in the surfacing of chaotic conflict.
A. 2. Organizational .Expectations
Expectations are seen as the result of drawing
inferences from available information. Thus, while goal
setting might be seen as both a way of stating what
considerations are .important in an organization and of
setting up evaluation standards, expectations might be
thought of as projections of what will happen. One can
study expectations, then, both from the standpoint of how
inferences are drawn and of how information is made
available in the organization.

On the subject of inference drawing, two general
observations can be made- First, expectations are biased,
both consciously and unconsciously, by hopes, wishes, goals,
and internal bargaining. The manipulation is usually
subtle, but is occasionally overt. A classic case of the
latter occured in a major Naval weapons system acguisition
procurement project, which suffered a budget cut severely
limiting the number of units to be purchased for the fleet.
The cut was justified by a study showing that the new lower
number of weapons (less than half the number originally
planned) was adequate to meet the needs of the fleet;
however, the study was in response to, rather than in
anticipation of, the budget cut. Secondly, it appears that
the computational power and precision available in
organizations is limited.. One observes that only on a few
of the potentially relevant variables is data gathered and
projections made„ Also, the projections that are made tend
to be very simplistic, requiring a minimum of calculation.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with simplicity, but by
and large the capacity for more sophisticated methods seems
to be lacking, even when such methods may be justified.
Information availability within an organization is
strongly affected by the nature of the data gathering
system. Information becomes available in a fragmented,
sporadic fashion at different organizational and geographic
locations., Communication of the information is subject to
severe bias, delay.r and filtering effects; internal
communications is, in fact, a significant competitive weapon
within the organization. Thus the communication system
introduces significant distortion into the system; over the
long run, however, systematic bias seems to be at least
partially detected and accounted for.
Most significant decisions require information which is
not readily available, thus implying the need for a search

prodedure. In rational economic theory, a firm would have a
portfolio of potential investments, against which new
proposals would be continually evaluated. Information
search should, in theory, be treated just like any other
proposal, as a potential investment of resources which is
expected to yield a benefit. An information search project,
if accepted, would oe analagous to a prospecting expedition;
the world is searched in a systematic way with particular
data needs in mind, and any nuggets of information found are
brought back and assayed. In reality, this ideal picture is
inaccurate on a number of counts. First, project evaluation
and information search don't occur continually, but only as
a result of fairly obvious problems. Organizations don't
plan nearly as much as they fight fires, reacting to current
crises. Second, search activity is not itself treated as an
investment. Rather., there are various levels of search
activity that are called into play, so that for a given
situation there is a standard search procedure. Further,
the criterion of search activity is feasibility rather than
optimality. As soon as something is found that seems to
(more or less) solve the problem, the search stops; the only
questions asked are "Is it feasible?" and "Is it better than
what we have now?", rather than "Is this the best possible
way of handling the problem?". Finally, the search
procedure is not nearly so much a prospecting expedition as
a mating dance„ The direction of the search is largely
determined by the con,spicuousness of the alternatives, and
as various people, both inside and outside the organization,
have their own interests tied up in the decision they
naturally try to make their preferred alternatives the most
conspicuous ones- Thus, the organization is not only in
search of information, but interest groups are trying to
make at least parts of the information known to the
organization.

A. 3- Organizational Choice
Now that we have discussed how a firm identifies what
it is concerned with (organizational goals) and how it
foretells results (organizational expectations) , it is
possible to discuss how the choices are actually made.
Briefly stated, there are three basic principles in decision
making: 1) avoid consideration of uncertainty; 2) maintain
organizational rules and precidents; and 3) keep decision
rules simple.
It seems paradoxical to speak of firms avoiding the
consideration of uncertainty. After all, the world is
uncertain whether one likes it or not. There are
procedures, however, which minimize the need to predict
uncertain events., First, as summarized above, firms do very
little meaningful long range planning, moving instead from
one crisis to the next. Second, firms rely heavily upon
standard rules for doing things, whether these be
traditional methods, general industry practice, or standard
operating procedures.,. These not only influence (and in many
cases dictate) the decisions which are made, but provide
stability and predictability to the organization. Thus,
when Department A is working on a problem, it is already
known what the responses of Departments B and C to their
parts of the same problem are going to be. In addition,
planning records made within the organization act to fix
committments and expectations. "Plans, like other standard
operating procedures, reduce a complex world to a somewhat
simpler one. Within ratner large limits, the organization
substitutes the plan for the world — partly be making the
world conform to the plan, partly by pretending it does."
(Cyert and March, op. cit., p. 112). When possible,
organizations arrange a negotiated environment.
The stabilizing influence of standard procedures would
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largely be lost if the procedures were to change frequently.
The procedures build up around themselves a myriad of
precedents, understandings, and unspoken connotations, thus
becoming entrenched. When procedures are changed there is
always a period of uncertainty and unsettlement until things
"get worked out' 1 again. The second principle of decision
making, then, is to maintain the organizational procedures
and precedents.
The third and final principle is to keep decision rules
simple. Generally one searches for feasible alternatives
(rather than optimal ones) and implements the first one
encountered. Thus the search procedures strongly affect the
decision making process. There are, of course, problems
which come up which are not adequately covered by standard
procedures. Rather than elaborate procedures to cover a
wider variety of problems, organizations opt to keep the
rule simple and rely on individual judgement to provide
flexibility*
A. 4. Summary
The impression given by the discussion above is that of
organizational decision making which is in a narrow sense
irrational, but in a broader sense very rational. The fact
that such behavior is nearly universally observed strongly
indicates that it is functional, even vital, to the
operation of the firjn.
What then is the value of discussing analytic
techniques for making decisions?
First, it is important to recognize the potential of
analytic techniques. On problems that are reasonably
complex, particualrly when uncertainty is involved, formal

technigues can, if used properly (and that is a big "if")
,
nearly always result in better decisions. Second, effective
use of formal technigues does not reguire replacement of the
entire corporate decision making apparatus. An individual
manager can make effective use of such technigues on
problems falling within his own area, or in broader
problems, to yield results for his own evaluation of
alternatives, or as ammunition in corporate give and take.
The technigues themselves are useful for broad or narrow
problems, or for top or lower level decisions; however, due
to the fact that at some levels, for some problems, explicit
rationality would be a positive hinderence rather than a
help, one should pick the problems to be analyzed rather
carefully. This issue is discussed furthur in Section D.
after the technigues themselves are classified and discussad
in the next two sections.
B. Decision Making - A Taxonomy
There are any number of ways of classifying decisions -
by subject area (inventory decisions, personnel decisions,
etc.) , by managerial level (top level decisions, middle
level decisions, lower level decisons) , by importance
(critical, major, minor, etc.) , and so on. A taxonomy
should, tnough, be an aid to good decision making, not
simply an arbitrary classification scheme. Ideally a
decision maker could use a taxonomy not only to attach a
classification label to a given decision problem, but to
find an approach useful in solving his problem. Thus, the
starting point in constructing a decision taxonomy is to
consider the decision making process itself- This is done
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B.1- The Decision Making Process
Decision making involves, in essence, four steps,
forecasting or projecting, identifying alternatives,
determining measures of effectiveness of possible outcomes,
then making the choice„ The first step, forecasting or
projecting the needs of the organization, the outside
enviornment, future constraints upon the organization, and
so forth, defines the context against which any decision
must he evaluated. In some decisions this step is critical;
determination of capacity needs in training facilities
depends on forecasts of training volume and methodology, for
example. There are other cases where this step is less
important, as in choosing among methods to present a
standard block of training. In forecasting, it seems useful
to distinguish two extreme situations. The first extreme,
called in this paper a "well defined" situation, is one
where the objectives* the constraints, the structure, and
the relationships among variables in the problem are
relatively well understood. A good example of this is an
inventory policy decision. Demand is well understood and,
though uncertain, amenable to analysis. Costs of carrying a
given inventory level can be defined and calculated. Costs
of a stockout, though harder to calculate, can still be
understood and approximated. Relationships among supply,
demand, stock level, lead times, etc. can be easily
specified. Contrast this with the other extreme, an "ill
defined" situation, such as a decision problem like "what
should CNET's policy toward enlisted personnel training be
over the next five years?" Here a good deal of effort must
be expended simply in defining the critical questions, the
alternatives, and relevant considerations before the problem
can be meaningfully discussed. Initially, at least, the ill
defined problem would seem to call for a different type of
approach than the well defined problem.
11

Another characteristic of decision problems which can
be observed during the forecasting phase is the importance
of uncertainty. Occasionally the uncertainty in a problem
is relatively minor, so one can act as if all relevant
factors were known. Many resource allocation problems and
scheduling problems, for example, are of this type. Most
real problems, however, involve uncertainty to a major
degree, and decisions made under the assumption of certainty
may be grossly misleading. Thus, one must adopt different
techniques for dealing with these two types of problems.
The second step in decision making involves specifying
alternatives. In well defined problems these are usually
readily apparent; in the inventory policy decision,
alternatives are defined by all possible stock levels and
reordering policies, and the choice of the inventory control
mechanism itself. In ill defined problems a major effort
may be needed to define a set of reasonable alternatives.,
If uncertainty is a consideration, then it may be necessary
to specify contingent, as well as immediate alternatives.
Thus, techniques for dealing with decision problems under
uncertainty must include methods of identifying and
describing contingent decision structures.
In the third step in the decision process, measures of
effectiveness are specified. This involves considering the
job to be done and identifying considerations relevant in
evaluating alternatives. Sometimes a single measure can be
identified as an overriding consideration, but more often
one must deal with multiple criteria, some of which may not
be measurable. Suppose, for example, that the job is to
train pilots. Some relevant considerations are the leugth
and cost of training* final pilot proficiency, capacity of
the training pipeline, and a number of others. Only some of
these considerations are directly measurable, so it is
necessary to specify ways of estimating non-measurabie
12

outcomes. An approximate measure of pilot proficiency / for
example, can be constructed by use of subjective
evaluations, such as instructor comments, and results of
quantitative tests, such as proficiency exams. Finally
these various measures are combined into a single measure of
effectiveness. As a rule this last step is not performed
explicitly; it is unusual to find a manager who has
specified in any coherent manner the kinds of trade-offs he
is willing to make among effectiveness measures. Usually
decisions are made on a case-by-case basis by consensus or
"common sense"; these intuitive decisions do, however,
define implicit trade-off structures.
The final step in decision making is to select the best
alternative among those specified. A variety of technigues,
ranging from snap judgements to sophisticated and expensive
computerized models are available to aid this step. Indeed,
a major purpose of this taxonomy is to wed the decision
problem with the appropriate technique. The taxonomy and
the matching of problems and techniques is considered in the
next section.
B.2.. The Taxonomy
The taxonomy developed in this research is outlined on
Figure 1. Branches on the breakdown tree in Figure 1. are
numbered, so that the discussion below can be keyed to the
appropriate part of the breakdown structure. Note that the
major breakdowns, between well defined and ill defined
problems, certain and uncertain problems, and between single
and multiple measures of effectiveness, follow suggestions
made in the preceeding section of this report. An
additional breakdown, between problems not requiring thought
(branch j_ 1 J) and those requiring thought (branch [2]), is
13
















introduced at the top of the breakdown structure. This is
introduced, somewhat facetiously, as a reminder that many
prorlems are too trivial, too obvious, or too constrained to
justify detailed analysis. Throughout the discussion of
this taxonomy, in fact, it is important to remember that the
scope and expense of the analysis and the magnitude of the
original problem must be kept in proportion. Most of the
solution methods discussed below can be applied in either
relatively simple or relatively complex manners, depending
on the demands of the problem.
B-2-a. Well Defined, Certain, tridimensional Problems
(Branches [3] and [4 J)
In discussing the taxonomy, consider first a problem
which 1) requires thought, 2) is well defined, 3) can be
treated as certain, and 4) has a single measure of
ef f ectiveness. Most real problems aren't this
uncomplicated, but this simplest case is important as an
approximation for many real problems and as an introduction
to the more complex situations. Nearly all solution
techniques for more complex problems consist, in fact, of
ways to reduce them to this simplest case, then using the
techniques for this case to solve the problem. An enormous
variety of tecnniques suited for sucn problems is known;
here they are classified broadly as simulation techniques
(branch[ 3 J) and optimization techniques (uranch [4]). Some
of these solution techniques require computers for useful
implementation. The role of computers in organizational
decision making is discussed briefly in Section B.3.
Simulation techniques are, at heart, projection
techniques. Given a particular decision, the simulation
method predicts the outcome. In order to determine the best
decision, then, one must redo the simulation many times.
15

trying all possible decisions in order to find the best one.
Informal, "seat-of-the-pants" judgements are classified as
simulation techniques in this report, as judgements consist
essentially of projecting the consequences of an action,
then choosing among the actions. Simulation techniques can
be extremely straightforward. Every manager who has
projected a cash flow, forecast expenses, or set up a budget
has, in effect performed a simulation. The idea in
simulation is to formulate a set of rules which govern the
behavior of a system, then apply those rules to see how the
system acts- In forecasting expenses, for example, a very
simple system rule is "total expenses is equal to the sum of
all expense categories." It is then a trivial matter to see
how total expenses irary as each expense category is varied„
Although this particular simulation model is, in its own
way, very useful, it is limited in the insight it can give„
It is possible to build much more complex simulations,
perhaps to relate expenses to the output of the
organization, or to take account of the interdependencies
among the various expense categories. The more complex the
simulation becomes, the more expensive, time consuming, and
error prone it becomes, but the more potential usefulness it
has. There have been many cases where complex simulations
yield insights impossible to obtain in any other way.
Optimization techniques differ from simulation
techniques in that optimization techniques are designed to
not only predict outputs, but to determine automatically the
best possible decision. The price one pays for this
additional feature is usually a good deal of additional
complexity. It is difficult to conceive of any "quick and
dirty" optimization technique. There are, however, a number
of "standard" types of problems (such as linear programming
models) which can be relatively easily solved. If a
particualr problem fits one of these types, then optimizing
may be straightforward, although perhaps expensive. This is
16

a big subject, and a complete discussion of optimization is
well beyond the scope of this report. An introduction to
this field can be found in any good book on operations
research. A particularly useful one is Principles of
Operations Research by Harvey M. Wagner, Prentice-Hall, New
Jersey, 1969. A good, elementary, managerial-oriented
discussion of optimization and simulation, with examples of
how each can be applied, is contained in Chapters 6 and 7 of
Advanced Methods and Models by Springer, Herlihy, and Beggs,
Richard D» Irwin Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1965.
B.2»b. Well Defined, Certain, Multidimensional Problems
(Branch £5 J)
Consider now a slightly more complicated decision
problem, one that is still well defined and can be treated
as certain, but where multiple measures of effectiveness
exist (branch [5] on Figure 1). There are two approaches to
this situation. First one might try to express all the
measures in terms of some common measure, such as dollars.
Suppose, for example, one must decide whether or not to
install an expensive computer system to individually manage
student instruction, and that tests have shown a decrease in
the average length of training time under the computerized
system. There are multiple measures in this decision,
dollar cost and average training time. These could,
however, be reduced to a single measure, dollars, if one
could express the worth, in dollars, of having a student
complete training earlier. There are a number of other
technigues, some fairly simplistic and some quite elegant,
for reducing multiple criteria to a single criterion. These
will be discussed somewhat furthur in Section C3. in this
report. Once a single criterion is established, then either




In some problems it is easier to work directly with
multiple criteria than to try to reduce them to a single
criterion. If the problem is solved by a simulation
technique this is np particular problem; outcomes projected
by the simulation technique are characterized by many
measures of effectiveness rather than one, and in the end
the decision maker must choose among them. Thus, although
he may be able tp avoid an explicit specification of the
trade-offs he is willing to make among objectives, he cannot
avoid striking some kind of balance among them in the final
analysis. If one wishes to use an optimization technique to
solve the problem then working with multiple criteria
becomes very difficult. It is possible to make some use of
optimization; for example one might do a number of
optimization calculations, each time using a different
measure of effectiveness as the optimized criterion. With
some luck this would narrow the choices down enough to
effectively solve the problem. In the more general case,
though, it is difficult to make good use of optimization.
B.2.c. Well Defined, Uncertain, Unidimensional Problems
(Branch [6]).
Turning now to the case of a problem in which
uncertainty is important, tnough the problem remains well
defined, consider first a problem with a single measure of
effectiveness (branch [ 6 J) . This has been an extremely
important special case, particularly in the financial
literature, and has given rise to a number of ideas, all of
which are designed to translate this problem to an
equivalent problem under certainty, so that the usual
simulation and optimization solution techniques can be used.
Before discussing these approaches, a bit of terminology
must be introduced. In an uncertain problem one does not,
by definition, know in advance the exact value of the
18

outcome for any decision. One always knows, though, that
for a given decision some results are more likely than
others. It is possible to express this knowledge by
describing, or assessing, a probability distribution for the
outcome. Given the probability distribution, one can
calculate a number of data, the most important of which are
the mean or expected value (a measure of the average value
of the outcome) and the standard deviation (a measure of the
spread, or variability, in the outcome). It is also
possible to calculate the chances of any given value of the
output being exceeded.
The first approach to solving these problems ignores
uncertainty, in effect, as long as it stays within
predefined limits. In setting up the problem the decision
maker can specify such constraints as his maximum allowable
loss, or the probability that costs, for example, exceed a
given figure. Within these bounds he uses some simple
measure of outcome, usually the expected value, to solve his
problem. In this way he translates the uncertain problem
into a constrained problem under certainty, which is readily
solved by certain optimization technigues*.
A second approach doesn't utilize the probability
distribution as such but embodies such ideas as "Let's
assume that the worst (or best) possible event will occur,
then maximize our gain under that assumption.," It has been
pointed out that this approach can lead to overly
pessimistic (or optimistic) decisions, so a variation has
been developed which allows the decision maker to express
his personal attitudes toward risk by picking a value for a
"pessimism factor," which is then used to balance the best
and worst cases. Still another variation assumes that all
uncertain events are egually likely, then maximizes the
expected value of the criterion.
19

The third approach consists of defining a new, certain
easure of ef fectiveness, most commonly by subtracting a
onstant times the standard deviation from the expected
alue of the outcpme. The rationale is that, variations
eing equal, one would choose the alternative with the
igher expected value. If variations are not equal, then
ne must have a higher expected value to offset the
dditional risk of the larger variation. One is allowed to
et the degree of offsetting required by picking the value
f the constant referred to above.
All these approaches are useful in certain
ircumstances, but can be shown to lead to irrational
ecisions in other cases. A more general approach, known as
tility theory, can be shown to be valid for all problems,
iven that one believes some basic assumptions about the
eaning of the term "rationality." In the utility approach
he decision maker expresses his attitudes toward risk in
he form of a curve, called a utility curve. The utility
urve is then used along with the probability distribution
entioned above to calculate a measure of "goodness" which
ccounts automatically for the uncertainty in the results,
his utility measure can then be used with any of the
echnigues discussed under branch [3] to solve the problecu
his approach, although unfamiliar to many managers, is
traightf or ward. A more detailed discussion of utility
easures is contained in Section C.3.
•2.d. Well Defined, Uncertain, Multidimensional Problems
Branch [7])
Consider now a problem which is well defined, but where
ncertainty is important and multiple measures of
ffectiveness must be considered (branch [ 7 J on Figure 1.)»
ometimes the criteria can all be expressed in terms of a
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;ommon measure, as was discussed for problems with multiple
criteria with no uncertainty (branch [5]). To take the same
example, it might be possible to approximate the worth, in
Hollars, of shortening training by one day, then express the
incertainty both in the cost of the computer system and in
the number of days by which training would be shortened in
terms of a single, uncertain, total dollar figure. The
problem could now be solved by methods discussed under
Dranch [ 6 ].
In many problems' it is impossible to express the
;riteria in terms of a single criterion. A second approach
exploits the ideas of utility theory, discussed briefly
ibove. In the case tfhere a single criterion exists in an
incertain problem, one expresses his attitudes toward risk
Ln the form of a utility curve. In this case, where
Bultiple criteria exist, one can, in theory, do the same
:hing, except that the utility curve becomes a 3-dimensional
jr higher dimensional curve, a utility hyperplane. Because
)f practical difficulties, it is possible to determine what
:his hyperplane looks like only for certain special cases.
?ortunately most real problems can be treated as one of the
>pecial cases, so the multidimensional utility approach can
)e an extremely useful analytical tool. Even, if a problem
is one which doesn't fit the "special case" category, one
:an usually get a good approximate solution by treating it
is if it were, then seeing how sensitive the results are to
the utility assumptipns.
A third approach to this class of problems consists of
ising heuristic approximation technigues, or in more
everyday language, using reasonalble ideas that seem
nore-or-less to work.. One might, for example, select what
le considers the most important outcome measure, get a rough
Idea of the probability distribution of that outcome, then
nake a tentative decision based on that; he would then check
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the other outcooe measures to make sure that his solution
wasn't ridiculous before making the decision final. Another
commonly used approach has been to set "aspiration levels"
on all the criteria, then to search for a decision
alternative which has a reasonable chance of attaining all
the aspiration levels. In choosing training methods, for
example, one may set limits on the cost and the length of
training, the physical facilities needed, and the
prereguisites on the student input, then choose the method
which seems to have the best chance of meeting the limits.
The major problem with such heuristic methods is that they
depend heavily on the ingenuity and judgement of the human
decision maker, and humans can be shown to be notoriously
poor processors of uncertain, multidimensional information.
Both the methods mentioned above, plus many others one could
conceive of, can lead to bad decisions at times. Somewhat
more structured approaches can usefully suppliment, though
not supplant, the capacities of human judgment.
B-2,e« 111 Defined Problems (Branch [8])
The final category in the taxonomy consists of ill
defined problems (branch [8 J on Figure 1»), which are
defined here as problems in which the alternatives, issues,
and consequences are poorly defined and/or understood.
Solving an ill defined problem requires first making it into
a well defined problem; doing this requires a different type
of effort than discussed so far. Any real situation is
infinitely complex in detail, so the first step in analysis
is to identify the major issues and constraints in a
problem. Next, the major action alternatives should be
outlined, and some thought given to the impact of each
possible action upon the major issues. Third, the most
promising alternatives are selected for furthur study, then
this process repeated. Thus, the process of analysis is
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cyclical rather than linear. With each cycle the problem
and the issues become successively better defined until the
problem can finally be effectively defined and solved. In
the early stages of problem definition formal approaches are
of limited use, as the problem is mainly one of encoding
impressions, knowledge, and attitudes. Even at this stage,
however, systematic methods of thinking can pay dividends. A
systematic approach to decision making, both in ill defined
and well defined situations, is outlined in the next
section. Some of the component parts of this approach,
namely unidimensional and multidimensional utility theory,
have been referred tp above, while other parts have only
been alluded to.
B.3- Bole of Computer-Based Methods
Before concluding the discussion of organizational
decision making, spme comments regarding the role of
computers is appropriate. Computers, of course, have the
capacity of processing enormous amounts of data at
staggering speeds with excellent accuracy. In addition, it
is possible to build a good deal of sophistication into
computer programs. This can, under the proper
circumstances, allow a manager to supplement his own
expertise with the intelligence which went into designing
the computer program., For these and other reasons piles of
computer printouts, and occasionally computer time sharing
terminals, are becoming increasingly common sights in
managers* offices. The precise role played by the computer
in the decision making process can, however, vary a good
deal. One critical dimension to the computer's role, namely
the relative involvement of the computer versus the manager
in making decisions can be depicted as shown in Figure 2.
23













At one extreme, the computer can be used simply as a
data gathering and summarizing tool. The manager retains
not only all decision making perogatives, but the bulk of
the analytical workload. The computer may do a minimal
amount of computing (summarizing, calculating ratios,
computing variances,, etc.), but the primary use of the
computer in this mode is to feed data to managers for their
analysis and interpretation, and to handle routine
paperwork. The bulk of current applications are of this
type. Managerial and cost accounting systems, payroll
systems, and many production control systems, to name a few
examples, can be classified in this category.
The prevalence of such data gathering and file
maintenance systems has lead to the creation of sizeable and
reasonably complete data bases. These data bases are, in
most cases, potentially valuable for a variety of managerial
purposes. Data gathered and stored as part of a payroll
system, for example, is frequently useful in the analysis of
productivity and the projection of employee expenses. Data
from a billing and invoicing system can be used in inventory
control. The Navy maintains extensive records on equipment
maintenance and failure histories as part of the 3-M system;
this data is potentially useful to the training command in
indicating problem areas and possible training deficiencies.
The usefulness of a given data base for a new purpose is
limited, however, by the organization and scope of the data.
Usefulness of 3-M data to the training command, for example,
is limited by the fact that the training record of the man
responsible for given equipment is not recorded.
A more complex category of applications involves using
the computer to analyze data through simulation models. As
explained in Sectipn B.2.a., simulation techniques involve
representing a system in a mathematical form. Consider, for
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example, a simulation model to predict student throughput in
a training program. There are a number of factors which
clearly affect thrpughput, such as the nature of the
training to be performed and the skill level desired,
instructor availability and skill, the amount and type of
training equipment available, student intelligence and
motivation, and so on- The builder of the simulation model
attempts to determine which of these factors are most
important in determining throughput, and just how the
critical factors interrelate to determine the throughput.
He then puts these relationships into a mathematical form
which can be used in a computerized model. Once this is
done, the manager can use the simulation model in a number
of ways — to forecast some figure of interest, such as the
budget required to produce a given student throughput, to
perform "what if" analyses, to plan and design a new system
or a change to the present system, or in many other ways. A
feature shared by all simulation models is that the human,
the manager, remains in the decision loop. The computer
simply projects the effects of a set of assumptions, and it
is up to the manager to examine the results and either
change the assumptions and perform additional analysis, or
to make a final decision.
The next level of computer application involves the use
of computerized optimization techniques. Optimization
techniques, being designed to automatically determine the
best possible decisions in a given situation, have the
capability of removing the manager from direct involvement
in the decision process. Usually, however, the manager is
involved in interpreting and implementing the analytical
results. Indeed, mpst optimization techniques are designed
to yield information not only about the optimal decision,
but information on the sensitivity of the result to various
data and assumptions used in the model. The purpose of this
is to allow the manager to estimate the impact of factors
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not included in the model, and to explore the feasibility of
alternatives other than those derived by the optimization
technique. Thus, the manager and the computer usually
supplement one another in the decision process.
finally, there are some cases when it has bee,n shown
useful to eliminate the manager from the decision process
altogether. In many inventory systems a computer not only
sets reorder points and quantities, but places the order as
well. The only impact the manager has on this process is to
occasionally review the system performance and to adjust the
rules by which the cpmputer makes its decisions. Production
scheduling and process control are other areas where this
••closed loop" approach has been applied* All these
applications occur in situations which are repetitive, and
where the major variables in the decision process are known.
C. Outline of Formal Decision Analysis
The decision, aids outlined in the previous section,
although useful, don't provide a general method of attacking
most managerial decision problems. In these other areas
nearly all decisions are made intuitively, and there are
some circumstances when some better method than intuition is
desired. Perhaps .the decision is of major importance, or
the complexities and uncertainties of the problem are such
that there is a need to integrate the expertise and
knowledge of a number of people in the organization, or
perhaps there is a need to explain the issues and trade-offs
in the problem to someone else, either a superior an ally.
In any event, there are circumstances when a rational,
systematic method of outlining the decision process is
needed. The bag pf techniques for doing this are known
collectively as "decision analysis" or sometimes "decision




1- outline all alternatives and to consider all
possible consequences of each alternative in a
systematic way,
2. break a large, complex problem down into a series of
smaller, simpler problems so that different experts or
organizational units can contribute to the solution of
the problem in their particular areas,
3. specify and quantify uncertainty, and determine how
critical the uncertain variables are,
4. specify, in a logical manner, the trade-offs one is
willing to make among outcomes,
5» determine the worth of gathering furthur
information, and finally
6. determine which decision is the best one to make,
and to calculate a measure of how much better that
decision is than any other alternative. This last
point is useful in deciding, for example, whether
factors ignored in the formal part of the analysis
could possible change the decision.
The methods used to accomplish these purposes are summarized
belowo Basically there are four steps to decision analysis:
(1) structuring the problem; (2) determining uncertainty;
(3) determining preferences for outcomes; and (4) obtaining
results- These areas are discussed in Sections C.1. through
C.4. below* Ccmmeats on practical methods of applying
decision analysis are also made in Section C.4.
C. 1„ Structuring the Problem
Consider, for the purpose of illustration, a highly
simplified decision problem. Suppose you are trying to
decide whether to invest $1000 of your money in a bank,
where you are assured a 6% annual return, or in a business
venture- If the business is successful vou would receive a
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100% return over the next year, while if it went broke you
would lose everything. You will cash in your investment at
the end of one year in any case. To keep the problem
simple, assume these are the only two possibilities, and
that there are no other uses of your money that you wish to
consider. Finally, suppose it is possible to buy some
information concerning your problem. A business expert of
your acguaintence has heard of two other business ventures
of the type you're interested in; for a $100 fee he would
research the problem for you to find out how many of the two
were successful. This problem can be diagrammed in the form
of a decision tree, as shown in Figure 3. Note that the
decision tree lays out, in chronological order, all possible
decisions and uncertain events; by convention, the decision
points are represented by squares and the uncertain events
by circles. If you .invest in the bank, then the decision
tree shows a sure return of $1060 (the original $1000 plus
the 6% interest) at the end of the year. Similarly if you
invest in the business you will have either $2000 or nothing
at tne end of the year. If you purchase the information,
then you will find out that none, one, or two of the other
ventures were successful. This is treated as an uncertain
event since you don't know in advance which of these is the
true case. After receiving this information you can decide
on the bank or the business investment, with the
possibilities of gain or loss as shown. Note that the $100
cost of the information has been taken into account in
calculating the payoffs.
Even for this simple problem the decision tree is an
extremely useful device for organizing one's thinking, for
decomposing a large problem into a series of smaller ones,
and for gathering information. A decision tree also serves
as a good communication tool in outlining a problem to
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someone else. Decision trees have the advantage of being
easy to draw and manipulate, making them useful even when
high-powered analysis is not warranted.
C2*> Determining Uncertainty
A critical factor in the investment problem outlined
above is the probability of the business being successful.
One rarely knows in advance, of course, what the odds are,
but usually there is at least a vague impression of some
kind (the business "looks promising" or perhaps "seems
risky") . It is possible to guantify these impressions by
interviewing the decision maker, or better yet, an expert in
the field, to determine a probability distribution of the
odds. The probability distribution can then be used to
determine the attractiveness of the business venture. The
probability data can also be combined with objective data,
such as is obtained on the "purchase information" option, to
determine whether the venture still looks good after the
information comes in, and to determine whether or not the
information itself is worth the $100 cost.
C.3., Determining Preferences for Outcomes
In our example a single measure of effectiveness,
namely the amount of money at the end of the first year, is
used. Even in this case it is not clear hou to proceed; for
one thing, people's attitudes towards risks differ. It may
well be optimal, for example, for a poor man to pass up an
otherwise attractive investment because the chances of loss
are too great. Even when two individuals have the same
wealth one person may be more willing to take chances than
the other. A method for dealing with these considerations
was first suggested by von Neumann and Morganstern (Theory
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o£ Ga„m§s and EcoijoGjic Behavior, Princeton University Press,
1944) o Their idea was to pick, a "best" outcome and a
"worst" outcome whj.cn are at least as good and bad,
respectively, as any outcome you expect to get. In the
investment example, the best and worst possible outcomes are
$2000 and -$100. Then for each possible intermediate
outcome, one must assess a probability such that the
intermediate outcome is exactly as attractive as a gamble
between the best and worst outcomes. This probability is
called the utility of the outcome. For example, consider
the $1060 which we would receive by investing in the bank.
We assess the utility of $1060 by determining a probability,
which we will call p, so that the gamble in Figure 4. is
neither more nor less attractive than $1060 for sure. If p
were nearly one then the gamble would be more attractive,
while if p were nearly zero the $1060 would be more
attractive, indicating that there must be some value of p
between zero and pne where the choices are egually
attractive. Note that the value of p chosen would vary from
individual to individual, depending on the decision maker's
personal attitudes towards risk.
Finally, von Neumann and Morganstern point out that the
value of p (or the utility) is a measure of the relative
attractiveness of the $1060 consequence, and prove that the
expected value of the utilities of end points is a valid
decision criterion under uncertainty. To solve the
investment problem, then it is necessary only to assess the
utility for each end point, calculate the expected utility
for each decision, which is easily done, then choose the
action with the highest utility.
The validity of the utility approach depends upon
certain lehavioral axioms, or observations on rational
behavior. Briefly, the major ones are:
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Figure 4. Utility Assessment Example






which gives a payoff of $2000 with probability p
and a payoff of -$100 with probability (l-p)
You must set the value of p so that Qy and (b) are equally attractive
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a) given two consequences A and B, then either A is
preferred to B- B is preferred to A, or both A and B
are equally attractive;
b) if A is preferred to (indifferent to) B and B is
preferred to (indifferent to) consequence C, the A is
preferred to (indifferent to) C;
c) given a ufility assessment problem such as is
outlined on Figure II. 4.. it is always possible to
find a value p such that the gamble ana the "for sure"
amount are equally attractive; and
d) if consequence A is preferred to consequence B, then
of two different gambles between A and B, the one
offering the larger chance at A is preferred.,
These seem to be reasonable assumptions, but it has been
observed that people don't always act according to the
axioms- This fact indicates that utility theory may not be
a good descriptive theory, but emphasizes its potential
usefulness as a ££escriptide theory, i.e. one which
indicates improved decision methods.
In the case where multiple measures of effectiveness
must be used, the same basic ideas of utility theory hold.
Due to practical problems, however, it is possible to assess
a multidimensional utility function only if certain
assumptions about one's preferences hold. Fortunately, for
most problems the assumptions are valid, making it possible
to use the utility approach. These issues are discussed
more deeply in the Appendex.
C.4- Obtaining Results
Once the problem has been structured and the
probabilities and preferences assessed, obtaining results is
a straightforward computational matter. Simple problems can
be solved by hand, while for more complex analyses a number
of computer methods can be used- The hardest part, by far,
in a decision analysis is in structuring the problem and
gathering data, rather than in calculating the solution. A
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good deal of "art" is required in selecting the portions of
a problem to explicitely represent, as a decision tree can
rapidly become overly complex if too much detail is
included. As discussed in Section B.2.e., analysis is
generally a cyclical* rather than a linear process. This
comment applies particularly to this type of analysis. The
first cut at a problem should outline major alternatives and
outcomes only roughly. After lopping off the least
promising branches of the initial tree, the remaining part
can be elaborated, and this process continued as long as is
necessary.
D. Use of Formal Decision Theory in Organizations
In this section the question of applicability of the
decision analytic techniques outlined above is taken up once
again. In Section A* some questions were raised concerning
the role of formal analysis in real organizations,
indicating that it is important to identify the types of
problems for which formal techniques would be useful. One
way of approaching this issue is to summarize successful
applications of the method. This is done in Section D.1-
Then in Section D.2. some conclusions regarding
applicability are discussed.
D.1- Applications of Decision Analysis
Decision analysis, in its present form, resulted from a
marriage .between a particular school of thought concerning
statistical analysis (the so-called "Bayesian" approach) and
the von Neumann - Morganstern theory of utilities. Von
Neumann and Morganstern were interested primarily in
applications in econpmics, giving that side of the union a
strongly business oriented bent, and as the union was
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consuaaated largely i.n graduate schools of business, most of
the applications work has been in a business setting-
Reinforcing this propensity has been the fact that business
probleas have a natural, easily measured, common measure of
effectiveness, namely profit.
D.1-a. Business Applications
An important early application of decision theory is
Markowitz (1959). Markowitz was concerned with the rational
investment of funds in a portfolio of potential investments,
each characterized by an expected monitary return and a
degree of riskiness. The portfolio problem is how to
determine the investment, or mix of investments, which
optimizes the return/risk tradeoff. This line of work has
been considerably expanded in recent years; the portfolio
selection literature is too large and diverse to review
here, but a good deal of it utilizes decision analysis
methodology.
The portfolio selection process has a direct analogue
in business decisions involving capital investment.
Katheson (1969) discusses an analysis of new product
development alternatives. Briefly, a major manufacturing
research company cas developed two compounds for a
particular market, and the decision must be made to do final
development on neither, both, or only one of them, and if
the latter, to decide which one. Katheson presents a
discussion of the analytic process, the results and presents
his recommendations. The analysis snowed that one of the
two products was definitely more promising tnan the ether,
but tnat even the better of the two products did not look
profitable. However, this result was highly sensitive to
tne assumed size of tne international market. As a result,
the company undertook a : ore extensive analysis of tne
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international market- Cook (1968) presents another analysis
of a product development, this time in the atomic power
field- Four different product development alternatives for
atomic electric generating stations were analyzed. A
complex computer model of the market, costs, demands, and
sales aspects of the problem was constructed and evaluated
by decision analytic techniques. Cook summarized the value
of the analysis as follows:
1) The deterministic, sensitivity, and uncertainty
evaluations can be modeled in sufficient detail to
demonstrate intuitively satisfying characteristics and
magnitudes.,
2) Some of the investigations, particularly venture
timing, the effect of margins, and the time value of
money, produced information that would not have been
available either quantitatively or intuitively
otherwise.
3) Sensitivity analysis is a powerful tool in
evaluating the parameters that are of greatest
influence, in establishing an understanding of single
and multiple responses, and in establishing on a
well-justified basis an approach to economic modeling.
4) The uncertainty analysis developed methods of prior
building that enabled the communication of a great deal
of information about the system which had, heretofore,
been undeveloped. The method of simulation can be used
on complex systems with reasonable cost., A great deal
was learned about the technical - economic system
uncertainties by the thinking required to develop the
basis for uncertainty analysis. Risk can thus be
examined both on the basis of the expected outcomes and
also upon the distribution functions of uncertainty.
5) Outstanding advantages in thinking about
alternatives, updating information, and considering new
situations that present themselves are available using
these techniques. The models developed allow such
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steps to be done easily and quickly, and the thinking
upon which each step is based is documented so that
communications of ideas can be made without introducing
vagaries. [Cook(1968), pp. 353-354].
Additional analyses of a similar nature are described
in Frederick (1973) and Laessig & Silverman (1974).
Frederick describes a product pricing problem for butadiene,
a petrochemical product, in which multiple decsion criteria
were considered., The article by Huber (1974) contains a
review of a number of field studies, primarily business
oriented, in which multidimensional utility models were
used. Laessig & Silverman discuss a risk analysis technique
for use in capital project evaluation. A more complete and
general discussion of risk analysis in capital projects is
contained in Spetzler (1968). Spetzler interviewed a number
of executives of a company, then used the resultant utility
assessments to formulate a corporate risk policy. The risk
policy has been used for a number of major projects within
the company. It was (at the time of writing) too early to
see concrete results, but the educational process attendant
to formulating the risk policy was itself seen as a
significant benefit.
Decision analysis has also been shown to be useful in
settings other tha<n investment problems. Keeney (1969)
discusses an application of multidimensional utility theory
to determine the optimal organization of a telephone
network. The object was to maximize the degree of service,
as determined by the percentage of the time lines are
availiabe to two different customer groups.
Perhaps the best summary of this section is found in
Brown (1970). In this article the results of a survey among
firms using, or who have used, decision analysis, are
reported. The firms surveyed included organizations with
30

several years of active experience in decision analysis,
some where the method is fairly new but is in active use,
some where there is interest but little application, one or
two where decision analysis has been a disappointment, and
two consulting firms with expertise in the area. Brown
found that general decision-making procedures aren't
radically affected by the presence of decision analysis, but
that individual decisions are often profoundly affected to
the good. The consensus among the survey participants was
that the methods had enormous potential which is not yet
realized. Major problems seen in using the method are: 1)
management educations 2) communications between the analysts
and the managers for whom the analysis is done; 3) in many
organizations it is difficult to identify who is responsible
for specific decisions; and 4) organizational obstacles.
Brown concludes that "If there is one dominant feature that
distinguishes the successful from *-he less successful
applications of (decision analysis)
,
judging from the
findings of this survey, it is the organizational
arrangements - - . The most successful appears to be the
'vest pocket 1 approach, where the analyst works intimately
with the executive and typically reports to him."
D*1-b. Medical Applications
A rich literature has grown up describing applications
of decision theory to medical problems. Among the reasons
for this are: medical decisions have important consequences
in cost, suffering, and death; medical problems are complex
and involve uncertainty; the volume and fragmentation of
knowledge requires an effective integrating structure; data
is widely available and relatively easily obtainable; and
public interest in medicine is high. Although medical
decisions per se are not of interest in this research, the
methodology of applying decision analysis which is
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demonstrated in this field is. In particular, medical
decisions typically require consideration of multiple
objective criteria, and a number of techniques for dealing
with this problem are described in this literature.
A number of articles describe the application of
decision theory to specific medical diagnostic or treatment
problems. Giaugue and Peebles (1974) discuss analysis of
the treatment of strep throat and rheumatic fever,
developing in the process a scheme for evaluating
conseguences with as many as ten attributes. Ginsberg
(1971) performs a similar analysis for the pleural -
effusion syndrome (which involves fluid in the lung cavity)
,
while Ginsberg and Offensend (1968) discuss a diagnostic
problem in spinal bone disease. The approach to the
multidimensional consequence evaluation in both these cases
was somewhat simpler. Thomas et^ al_. (1973) analyze the
diagnosis of heart disease, while Schwartz gt. al_. (1973)
discuss hypertension (high blood pressure). Some of the
papers [particularly Giauque and Peebles (1974), Ginsberg
(1971), and Schwartz et_. al^ (1973) J contain general
discussions of decision analysis in addition to the specific
studies-
More general approaches to broad problems are contained
in Giaugue (not yet published) and Lustid (1971) . Giauque
discusses a utility approach to measuring the quality of
health care, with a particular application in the treatment
of hypertension- Lusted discusses the use of decision
theory in interpreting X-rays. Lusted (1968) contains an
extensive bibliography of other medical analyses.
D.l.c. Public Sector Applications
Public sector applications are particularly difficult
40

to analyze since tJaey have neither the natural measurement
criterion of profit found in business applications nor the
data availability of medical applications* Decision
analysis offer methods both for dealing with the multiple
criteria reguired in public sector analysis and the
uncertainties caused by lack of data, leading to a
significant literature on public sector applications.
Some of the studies concentrate on relatively
independent problems with well defined decisions. Howard,
flatheson, and North ,(1972) , for example, discuss the problem
of deciding whether or not to seed hurricanes with silver
iodide. Experiments with seeding have shown promising
results, but a decision to seed a hurricane bearing down on
populated areas carries legal and moral consequences.
Howard et^ ai_. used decision analysis to examine the problem
and to explore other decision alternatives besides the
"seed" and "don't seed" alternatives. In Giaugue (not yet
published - II) a scheme to determine an optimal method of
oil spill cleanup in harbors, depending on the geographic
and climatic conditions at the harbor, is presented. Keeney
(1969) explores bipod bank inventory control and cost /
benefit relationships of depth surveying in the Cape Cod
Ship Canal through use of a multidimensional utility
analysis.
A second group of papers are broader in scope, but
still deal with well defined problems and priorities. Gear
(197a) and Boche (.1972) present analysies of planning in
education- Gear, after discussing approaches to a number of
common educational decision problems, presents an analysis
of secondary school pupil allocations between adjacent
geographical areas. fioche discusses an extensive
investigation into the problem of resource allocation among
different subject areas in a secondary school. This
involved determininc the tradeoffs the school board and
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school administratipn are willing to make among proficiency
levels in the various subjects. Other applications areas
include space and military planning. Katheson (1969)
presents a method for planning payloads on unmanned Martian
exploration vehicles. Power (1973) discusses an interactive
system, utilizing decision analytic concepts, to plan cost
and schedule estimates for antiballistic missile programs.
Finally, some studies work with very large problems
directly affecting large segments of the population, where
alternatives and goals are imperfectly understood and poorly
articulated.. Stanford Research Institute (1968) conducted a
study for the Mexican Government, in which a strategy for
electrical power system expansion for the entire country
over the next 30 years was derived. This involved
forecasting a complex array of power needs, technical
advancements, price movements of various fuels, and so
forth, over this time frame. In addition, a number of
social trade-offs had to be considered. For example, the
impact on employment, self-sufficiency, side benefits, and
technical expertise required are very different for say,
nuclear versus hydroelectric generating plants. This study
is referred to and discussed in Matheson (1969) and Howard
(1971) .
In a separate study, Keeney and Nair (1974) discuss the
complex issues and tradeoffs involved in licensing nuclear
power plants within the United States, and propose a
decision analytic based approach to solving these issues.,
Hammond (1971) and Ellis & Keeney (1972) derive methods to
analyze problems of strategic military planning and air
pollution control, respectively. Finally, deNeufville and
Keeney (1972) consider the possibilities for future
development of the Mexico City, Mexico airport. Two
possible locations are considered, and a number of possible
development strategies discussed. A number of effectiveness
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measures were used, specifically noise problems, cost,
capacity, safety, transportation time, and the number of
people displaced by the airport expansion.
D.2- Applicability of Decision Analysis
The summary abpve, although by no means exhaustive, is
extensive enough to show the variety of problems for which
and contexts in which decision analysis has demonstrated
usefulness. Problems can ne simple or complex, single or
multi attributed, well defined or nebulous, big or small,
Decison contexts can be business, medical, educational,
defense, public, private, simple, or complex. Is it
possible to glean, then, any general principles of
successful application from this survey?
The overriding impression one gets from reading the
applications literature is the importance of the
relationship between the analyst and the decision maker.
What is studied does not seem to be nearly as critical as
hoy the study is performed. In the words of Keeney and
fiaiffa (1972), "The metadecision of whether or not to do
formal analysis cannot be divorced from the questions of
organizational structure, of the personal incentives for the
people involved, and of the quality of the analysts." Brown
(1970) also emphasizes the quality of the analyst - client
relationship. In, a way, this is disappointing, since the
above amounts to saying "Get a good analyst and a motivated
manager, get them working well together, and no matter what
the problem is you 1 !! get a good analysis." This is the
same thing that operations researchers have been saying for
years, and like it or not, it seems to be true in decision
analysis as well.
Some additional light on this issue can be obtained by
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referencing Figure 1„ (A Decision Taxonomy) on page 14 of
this report. Branches of the taxonomy tree marked with an
asterisk are those where decision analysis is most likely to
be useful. If problems are well defined, certain, and have
a single decision criterion (measure of effectiveness), the
particular strengths of decision analysis aren't really
called into play„ In other types of problems, though, the
usefulness of the method can be dramatic, either alone or in
conjunction with other technigues. The structural aspects
of decision analysis are helpful in defining problems,
specifying the magnitude of uncertainty, providing for
contingent decisions, and determining the sensitivity of
results to assessments and assumptions. The utility
formulation allows one to specify objective criteria valid
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Appendix - Decision Analysis Methodology
(based on a Masters Thesis by Kenneth H. Kerns, LCDR,
USN)
Man is often confronted with situations in which the
conseguences of any action he takes are not certain.
Events may intervene which he can not control or
predict with certainty. A large number of decisions
under uncertainty are made by intuition. The intuitive
decision process is accomplished in the
decision-maker's mind. Because of this, there is no
way to verify that this type of decision is the logical
conseguence of the choices, information and preferences
that were available to the decision-maker. For many
problems, however, it is important that the
decision-maker is able to show people why he arrived at
a particular decision and also for them to be able to
see what changes in factors surrounding that decision
might have led to a different decision. Another
characteristic of the intuitive decision process is the
human tendency to equate the quality of the decision
with the quality of the outcome it produces. For
example, consider a situation where an investor decides
to buy some new stock. If he loses money, the tendency
is to say that the investor made a bad decision;
conversely, if he makes money, then he made a good
decision. A good decision is a decision which
maximizes the probability of a good outcome; hence,
making a good decision is no guarantee of a good
outcome. The decision- maker has control of the
decision. He does not have control of the outcome.
The purpose of decision analysis is to allow the
decision-maker to niakt; consistent good decisions and to
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formulate them in quantitative terms that can be
conveyed from one person to another. Formal decision
analysis is a systematic process comprising the
following steps:
(1) structuring the problem,
(2) assessing relative preferences for possible
consequences,
(3) evaluating the probabilities for uncertainties and
(<J) determining the best course of action from the
information in the preceeding steps.
This process is an iterative process. First, a broad
description of the problem with rough assessments of
the preferences for the consequences and probabilities
for the uncertainties is analyzed. On the basis of the
first analysis, alternatives are added or removed from
consideration. The measurements are refined and the
process is repeated until there is satisfaction with
the results of the analysis.
The purpose of this appendix is to acquaint those
unfamiliar with decision analysis with its theory and
techniques. This appendix is organized to explain the
methodology of decision analysis for each step in the
formal analysis. Before proceeding, it is necessary to
explain certain terms and notations which are used
throughout the remaining parts of this thesis.
A. CLARIFICATION OF TERMS AND NOTATIONS
The terms "is indifferent to", "is preferred to",
"lottery" and "utility function", are widely used in
the following sections of this thesis. For clarity,
they need to be explained. The term "is indifferent
to" is to be used to mean the same as the statement
"the decision-maker is indifferent to receiving either
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of the outcomes." The term M A is preferred to B" is to
be used to mean the same as the statement "the
decision-maker prefers A over B."
The term "lottery" is defined as a gamble of some
uncertain event E where the prize X is won if the
event E occurs and the prize X is won if the event E
does not occur. Let p represent the probability that
E occurs and let 1 - p represent the probability that
E does not occur. Notationally, the lottery L will be
E
represented as <X ,p , X >.
*
The term "utility function" is defined as a function u
which assigns a real value to every consequence a and b
such that u (a) is larger than u (b) if and only if a is
preferred to b. The notation u (a) is expressed as the
"utility of consequence a" and is represented by a real
number.
With the above terms clarified, the steps in a formal
decision analyses process can be explained. The first
step in this process is structuring of the problem.
B. PROBLEM STRUCTURE
In structuring a problem in which events are uncertain,
the options or alternatives are enumerated. Next, all
the events that can possibly occur are specified. As a
last step, the alternatives and uncertain events are
51

arranged in chronological order.
A type of diagram known as a decision-flow diagram or
"tree" is a useful tool in decision analysis. It is a
chronological arrangement of the alternatives which are
controlled by the decision-maker and the events
determined by chance. To illustrate the construction
of a decision-flow diagram, consider the following
problem. A decision-maker is faced with two
alternatives, I and II. Both alternatives involve a
situation where the outcomes a or b are uncertain. If
a occurs, then the decision-maker must decide between
alternatives III and IV. Alternative III also involves
an uncertain situation leading to either the outcome c
or d.
The decision-flow diagram is shown in Figure A.1.
Observe that the branching points or forks are of two
types: decision forks and chance forks. A decision
fork is designated by a small square and a chance fork
by a small circle. There is additional information
provided in the diagram which will be discussed in the
sections below.
With the alternatives and uncertain events described by
a decision-flow diagram, the next step in the decision
analysis process is the assessment of the relative
preferences for the consequences.
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF PREFERENCES
The establishment of preferences for the consequences
provides the decision- maker with the basis for the
rational choice between the alternatives. This depends




The consequences may encompass a number of factors or
attributes such as cost, schedule and performance.
These attributes might also be of an intangible nature





U (X ,x ,x ) =u12 3 1
U (X .X .X ) =u12 3 2
U (X ,x ,x ) =u12 3 3
U (X ,x ,x ) =u12 3 4
U (X ,x t x ) =u12 3 5
U (X , X ,x ) =u12 3 6
U (X gX ,x ) =u12 3 7







In this step in the decision analysis process, an
objective function is defined to indicate a measure for
the preferences for the consequences.
A general methodology for defining an objective function
in decision analysis problems exists in the form of
utility theory. Consequences may be described by a
single attribute or a multiple set of attributes. Both
situations are presented below.
1 • Sin2i§_At tributes
In the case of a single attribute, an objective
function, hereafter called a utility function, can be
defined which has the property that the maximum
expected utility among the alternatives indicates the
most preferred action.
A utility function with a single attribute can be
constructed in the following manner. Define X and X
as the upper and lower limits over a range of possible
*
consequences X such that X >X >X . For every possible
i i *
consequence X , define the utility u (X ) as the value
i i
p such that the decision-maker is indifferent to
i
receiving X for certain and receiving the lottery
i
*
<X ,p ,X >. The value of p ranges from zero to one,
i * i
*




Once a set of points (X ,p ) have been established,
i i
a utility curve may be drawn. Figure A. 2. illustrates
three possible utility curves. A utility curve
generally has two characteristics. It is smooth and
the general shape of the curve is either convex,
straight or concave as illustrated respectively by
curves 1, 2 and 3 of Figure A. 2. Any break in the
curve would indicate either an inconsistency in the
choices for p in the lottery <X , p , X > used to assess
i i *
the points of the curve, or a guantum jump in
preference for a small change in X . A convex curve
i
indicates a risk averse behavior. That is, the
decision-maker is more inclined to take a conseguence
known for sure than to take a gamble with the same
expected value,. A concave curve indicates that the
decision-maker 4s risk seeking. He is more inclined to
take the gamble than to take the known conseguence. A
straight line indicates that the decision-maker acts on
the expected value of the conseguence. He is neither
risk averse nor risk seeking.
Once the utility curve is established for a single
attribute conseguence, a value from one to zero is
assigned to each conseguence corresponding to the point
on the curve. A higher value for a conseguence
indicates greater preference for that conseguence than
for a conseguence with a lower utility value.
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The basic concept of the construction of a utility
function with a single attribute described above can be
generalized to the case where many attributes must be
considered. However, the above assessment scheme is
impractical. First, too many points must be assessed.
Secondly, humans find it difficult to think in terms of
multiple attributes. In decision problems under
uncertainty, many people when faced with situations
where more than one attribute is relevant, tend to pick
the one attribute judged most important to them and
theu make the decision on that factor alone.
There are procedures for decomposing a multiple
attributed utility function into combinations of
unidimensional functions. Conditions required for
decomposition include the properties of utility
independence, pairwise preferential independence and
pairwise marginality. These are described below.
Keeney [fief. 1] shows that a multiattriouted
utility function can be expressed in one of two forms,
additive or multiplicative, dependent on which of the
properties of utility independence, pairwise
preferential independence or pairwise marginality hold.
If a utility function of multiple attributes can be
expressed in these forms, then the task of defining the
utility function is much easier. Suppose X =
(x ,...,x ) describes a consequence where u (X) denotes
1 n
the utility of the consequence X. Utility independence
is defined in the following manner. Let x. =
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(x ,..,x /X ,...,x ). The attribute x is utility
1 i-1 i+1 n i
independent of x
_
if the decision-maker's relative
i
preference for x , with x held fixed, is the same
i i
regardless of the actual value of x chosen. Order
i"~
one mutual utility independence is defined to mean that
x is utility independent of x for all i. If order
i i
one mutual utility independence holds then u(XJ can be
expressed in the guasi-additive form
n n n
u (x ,...,x ) = 7 u (x ) + 7 > c u (x ) u (x ) + ....
1 n 1-1 1 i i=1;j =1ijiijj
Pairwise preferential independence is said to hold
if the trade-offs one is willing to make between
attributes taken two at a time, are not dependent on
the values of the remaining attributes. Let X =
ij
(x ,..,x ,x /.-/X ,x ,...,x ), and let x _ be
1 i-1 i+fl j-1 j+1 n ij
a particular value from X . The attributes x , x
ij" i J
are pairwise preferentially independent of X _ if
ij
one's preference order for the conseguences (x , x ,
i 3






If for any pair of attributes x and x , the lottery
i J
<(x ,x ),0.5,(x ,x ) > is indifferent to the lottery
i J i D
<(x ,x ),0.5,(x ,x )> then pairwise marginality is
i J i 3
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said to hold [Ref. 2J.
With the ideas of utility independence and pairwise
preferential independence presented, Keeney's results
can be more precisely stated [Ref. 1j. Let X =
(x ,...,x ) be as previously defined, with n > 3. If,
1 n
for some x , x and x are pairwise preferentially
i J










MX) = 5 k u (x )




1 + K u(X) = H" [ 1 + Kk u (x ) ]i i iill
(2)
where u and u are utility functions scaled from zero
i
to one, the k are scaling constants with < k < 1
i i
and K > -1 is a non-zero scaling constant. Equation
(1) is the additive form and equation (2) is the
multiplicative form.
Given that the conditions of Keeney's Theorem hold,
he provides a property required to show whether the
function is additive (1) or multiplicative (2). He
shows that if pairwise marginality holds then the
function must be additive; otherwise, it is
multiplicative. Table I summarizes the properties






















Referring to Figure A.1., there are three
attributes x , x and x which describe each outcome of
1 2 3
the tree. For illustration, the following utility
function might be used :
u(x ,x ,x ) = u (x ) + u (x ) + u(x ) = u .12 3 1 2 3 i
This utility function, in the additive form, maps the
consequences x , x and x into a scalar value
1 2 3




The decision-flow diagram is one of the decision
analysis methods used in structuring a problem.
Utility functions can be used for the assignment of
preferences for the consequences of the outcomes at
each tip of the tree. What remains to complete the
information included on the decision-flow diagram is
the assignment of the judgmental probabilities at the
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chance forks representing the uncertain events. This
is the third step in the decision analysis process.
Raiffa [Ref. 3 J addresses the question of whether the
decision-maker's hunches or vague impressions should be
calibrated, and if so, how this should enter into the
formal decision analysis process. He argues that if a
decision-maker wishes to act consistently, then he
ought to assign values to judgmental probabilities such
that the sum of the probabilities of an event occurring
and not occurring equals one. This judgmental
probability assessment for an event should not depend
on the outcomes. He points out that judgmental
probabilities satisfy the usual rules of probability
theory and can be used in the same manner as objective
probabilities.
Judgmental probabilities are used as a measure of the
decision-maker's beliefs concerning the uncertainty of
an event occurring, provided that these beliefs are
consistently applied to every uncertain event in the
analysis. They are assigned to each chance fork of the
tree. In Figure A.1., they are represented as p ,
1
1-p P # 1-p / P # 1-P i P and 1-p . With this
1 2 2 3 3 4 4
information, the final step in any iteration of the
decision analysis process is to determine the
recommended course of action.
E. RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION
Determination of the recommended course of action
involves a sequence of calculations called by Raiffa
[Ref. 3] the "averaging out and folding back"
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procedure. This procedure is often referred to as the
process of backwards induction in the theory of dynamic
programming [Ref. 3]. The procedure starts at the
tips of the tree and consists of computing the expected
utility of each chance fork and the selection of tne
greatest utility at each decision fork. The process is
repeated for each level of the tree until the starting
decision fork is reached. The alternative with the
greatest expected utility is selected as the
recommended course of action. The selection of the
maximum expected utility is an appropriate means of
determining actions consistent with the
decision-maker's attitudes and opinions [Ref. 2].
This point is presented and developed in such sources
as Schlaifer [Ref. 4] and Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaifer
[Ref. 5J.
To illustrate the "averaging out and folding back"
process, the information contained in Figure A.1. is
used. Starting at the chance fork labeled 1 , the
expected utility is computed as
u p + u (1-p ) = E13 2 3 1
Moving backwards in the tree, tne next fork encountered
is a decision for*., labeled 2 . The value of E or
1
u , whichever is greater, is selected. For
illustration, E is selected. Continuing backwards
1
through the tree, a chance fork, labeled 3 , is
encountered. At this point, the expected utility of
the chance fork is computed as
E p + u (1-p ) = E .114 1 2
f.1.

Alternative I has now been reached and tne expected
utility of this alternative is E . In similar fashion.
2
the expected utility of alternative II is commuted.
The results are compared and the alternative with the
greatest expected utility is selected as the
recommended course of action.
F. SUMMARY
On most occasions, people make decisions intuitively and
more or less inconsistently. There are occasions when
the decision must be made in a reasoned, deliberate
manner.. Decision analysis methodology was introduced
to provide this. In the systematic process of decision
analysis, the decision-maker starts by structuring the
anatomy of his problem in a decision-flow diagram that
depicts the chronological interactions between his
alternatives at any stage and the events which are
controlled by uncertainty. He scales his preferences
for the consequences at the tips of the decision tree
in terms of utility values and scales his judgments
about uncertain events in terms of probability
assignments at the chance forks in a consistent manner.
Finally, he selects his oest strategy for action by the
process of "averaging out and folding back."
Most "real life" problems are complex. Trees exhibiting
the structure of these problems can be so complex as to
make a detailed analysis of the alternatives
impractical. $•> An iterative process is used.
Initially, alternatives and measurements are specified
in a rough manner. Frequently, some of the decision
branches will turn out to be nonoptiiual and can be
eliminated from the tree. If the decision branch is
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close to the base of the tree, a sizable portion of the
tree can be eliminated. After elimination, further
effort can be put into refining the description of the
remainder of the tree. This iterative process is
repeated until the decision can be satisfactorily made.
There is an "art" to analyzing real problems as
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